In 1947, two supposed monolithic post-colonial states, Pakistan and India, emerged from
centuries of British Raj. The intentional codifying of pre-existing communal prejudice by the British, the legacy of British colonization, the advent of nationalism on a large scale, and the increasing demand for Indian independence led to this division of the region. However, the polarization namely between Muslims and Hindus resulted in the massive upheaval of fourteen million migrants to and from what would become Pakistan. (1) The Partition is as Ayesha Jalal posits, “A defining moment that is neither beginning nor end, the partition continues to influence how the peoples and states of postcolonial South Asia envisage their past, present, and future.” (2) It is also the most devastating: up to two million were killed in the sectarian violence, some three million went missing, and it was marked with “savage” sexual violence. (3) Today, from the denial of self-autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947, the unprecedented siege of Kashmir in 2019, and to the most recent revealing of the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019 that many fear is the first step of rendering Indian Muslims stateless, it is increasingly clear that the post-colonial legacies of South Asia are nowhere near their end.
In order to understand the subsequent violence during and after the Partition, as well as today’s recent events, the historical context of Indian nationalism is necessary. The All-India Congress was formed in 1885, and it’s very founding set a precedent of alienation and exclusion. Did Congress seek to represent the narrow self-interest of imperial loyalists and did it aim to be a political association devoid of culture? It lacked notable Muslims members which affected its’ success in the beginning and in 1947. Early nationalist leaders were divided between moderates such as Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, and radicals such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Today’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) party in India is reminiscent of Tilak’s views: communal logic and Hindutva nationalism was a staple for his politics. His early writings and partaking in establishing Hindu festivals laid the groundwork for communal lines. (4) Congress itself was for the elites’ views and self-interests, and remained so. It is here, at the very beginning, that Muslims, Sikhs, Jains, and Christians were reduced to their status as minorities. Indian nationalism was equated with being Hindu and anything else was easily called separatism which eventually took shape in the All-India Muslim League in 1906. As this nationalistic sentiment grew (colonial and anti-colonial nationalism), so did the divide between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority.
Spearheaded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the All-India Muslim League at first had little to none influence and eventually gained 96% of the votes in all Muslim constituencies in the 1946 elections. (5) The elections are largely seen as cementing the birth of Pakistan, as well as proving that the All-India Muslim League represented Muslims. (6) To understand why and when this communal divide became apparent, one does not need to look farther than the All-India Congress’ exclusion of Muslims and their steadfast goal of maintaining Hindu majoritarian rule at the center. When the All-India Congress came under the leadership of Tilak, the Lucknow Pact between the League and Congress was signed, only to be broken due to Mohandas Gandhi’s intense alienation of Jinnah and usage of Hindu clothing, terms, and support for an encompassing Hindu India. Gandhi was in favor of the status quo - be it in South Africa or India. His early writings reveal that he was indeed a racist, calling blacks in South Africa, “troublesome, very dirty and live almost like animals.” (7) He did not use Hindu rhetoric when advocating for South African Indians, (8) demonstrating that his Hindu attire, his commitment to a Hind Swaraj, and his utilizing of phrases such as “Ram Rajya” in India was a deliberate nod to catering to the Hindu majority. (9) In 1932, Gandhi mounted a fast-to-death in response to the British proposals of separate electorates, not just for Muslims, but Dalits as well. He never denounced the caste system, seeing it as a foundation for Hindu belief, but rather drew up the Poona Pact of 1932, promising that Congress would reserve seats for Dalits. This decision was not only because Gandhi believed this was the British sneaking away 30 million Hindu votes, but rather his opposition to granting rights to a minority at the expense of a Hindu majority. (10) Gandhi’s greatest feat, the Salt March, an enormous demonstration of non-violence was so he could gain a seat at the table which he did at the 2nd Roundtable Conference in London. Gandhi’s brilliant effect of mass mobilization was two-fold: it demonstrated people, not power and that non-violence was situational. It was a political tool used by institutions; the masses could only be deployed if they could be controlled. He employed ambiguous language which allowed him to adapt his persona to whatever was necessary. Gandhi himself launched the Quit India Movement in 1942, affirming that he was ready to risk violence to achieve his objectives. It is important to note that the majority Muslim provinces did not take part in the Movement as Gandhi promoted Hindu majoritarian values, which only grew Muslim suspicion. Gandhi opposed Partition during this time not because he wanted a united India but because it contrasted with his desire for Congress to have the ultimate power in a united India. (11)
Gandhi revered as a saint and a champion of non-violence in India and the world was a tactful politician at best. To Gandhi, there was no difference between religion and politics, something Jinnah vehemently opposed when Gandhi endorsed the Khilafat Movement, an orthodox Islamic movement calling Indian Muslims to rise up in jihad to save the Turkish Caliph. The Movement itself was disbanded after it resulted in violence. At the Congress Nagpur session of 1920, Jinnah declared, “I will have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious approach to politics. I do not believe in working up mob hysteria, politics is a gentleman’s game." It was here that Gandhi’s endorsed both violence across communal lines as well as a dangerous ploy of religious fanaticism. It was then that the League lost its appeal among Muslims and Jinnah, a secularist, was exiled in favor of orthodox leaders. Gandhi was “responsible for jettisoning sane, secular, modernist leadership among the Muslims of India and foisting upon the Muslims, a theocratic orthodoxy of Maulvis.” (12) The Khilafat Movement wreaked havoc among Muslims as it divided Muslim interest. It is foolish to say Gandhi did not anticipate the consequences of this: He was looking for a wholesale Hindu revival (13), which was achieved by meshing politics and religion together under the guise on non-violence. He capitalized on the chaos to further his dream of creating a Hindu India. This decision damaged beyond repair the alliance of the League and Congress, and as Jinnah predicted, led to chaos and bloodshed during the Partition.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi’s political heir, who consolidated power of Congress in the 1930s, was a secularist when it came to implementing policies as India’s first prime minister. Before 1947, his actions before and during the violent outburst of the Partition proved otherwise. Nehru, who was considerably influenced by Gandhi, not only stubbornly gave steam to the idea of two separate successor states, but also pushed for it to happen at a much earlier date, although he was fully aware of the mass riots and communal violence that would occur. (14) One year before the Partition, the Cabinet Mission proposed a three-tier solution that took into account the League’s demands, which both parties agreed upon, but sensing Congress’ insincerity, the League withdrew. (15) As it happened, Nehru gave a speech explaining the acceptance only came on the terms to modify the Cabinet Mission - a direct implication that above all, he would be in favor of Muslims having political disadvantages under the Hindu majority. (16) By rejecting the proposed solution, Congress paved the way to the Partition and did so intentionally. “A large and influential section in the Congress sincerely believed even during the freedom struggle that the interests of Hindu Indians could not be sacrificed at the altar of a united Independent India.” (17) The League announced Direct Action Day which was not intended to become the cross-communal Calcutta Killings as it is infamously known; it was a direct response to Congress’ insincerity. This was reminiscent of the 1937 elections, where Congress promised a coalition with the League, only to withdraw on the basis of their own conceit. A.J Noorani writes, “Nehru’s concept of secularism ... rendered a Congress-League Pact impossible and played into the hands of communalists within the Congress.” (18) The policy Congress undertook during the 1937 elections was the same one they would build upon up until after the Partition: “Congress ... intended to destroy the Muslim culture instead of protecting it.” (19) Jinnah commented at Lucknow in 1937, “The Hindus have been undoubtedly elated by the establishment of what is in effect a Hindu Government. There is a good deal of popular feeling that this is Hindu Raj ... the Hindu attitude towards communal questions has been aggressive lately.” This aggression ultimately became the Partition because Congress refused to share power.
It is lazy and simplistic to assume Mohammad Ali Jinnah was anything but a secularist, in his personal life and in politics. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 which evolved into the foundation of the ‘Pakistan Demand,’ had intentional ambiguity and itself aimed to address first and foremost, the problem of proportionate representation when it came to Indian minorities, namely Muslims, as Nehru himself stated. (20) Nehru’s remarks on the Lahore Resolution showed his reluctance to fix minority issues and treated them as inconvenient in the overarching goal of a Hindu center. “Minorities in India seemed to have been left to their fate – no provision or agreement had been reached as to what would become of them” (21) - and this is what the Lahore Resolution sought to answer. As early as 1944, Gandhi himself offered a two-state solution to Jinnah in the form of the C.R. Formula which Jinnah rejected, telling his Council that it was intended to 'torpedo' the Lahore resolution as it offered “a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan, and thus trying to pass off having met our Pakistan scheme and Muslim demand.” (22) Fast forward to 1946, and Congress again refused a united India at the Cabinet Mission. Jinnah was offered two alternatives - the Pakistan as it came to be established in 1947 and an Indian Union with groups of Muslim provinces. He accepted the plan on the basis that Congress would accept it fully. Gandhi condemned the plan immediately and Congress broke down the plan. Congress preferred India's partition to sharing power with the League in a united India and led millions to their deaths in the Partition. (23) When Congress rejected a federation, Jinnah was left with the Partition he had “dreaded all along” (24) and had refused multiple times, trying to sidestep the impending doom. He wanted to safeguard Muslim political rights in an overwhelmingly Hindu India after independence. Jinnah “[mis]calculated that when eventually the time came to discuss an all-India federation, the British and Congress would be forced to negotiate with organized Muslim opinion, and would be ready to make substantial concessions to create or retain that center. This, in turn, provided the best insurance that the League would not be given what it now apparently was asking for, but which Jinnah in fact did not really want.” (25) Congress, Nehru, and Gandhi were aware from the beginning of the implications and consequences of their decisions; the League and Congress wanted independence from the British, but the League did not want to accept a divided India. It was at the Congress’ insistence that the Partition took place for it secured their power for decades to come and the very exclusion of Muslims that marked Indian nationalist sentiment rears its head today. They were willing to drown the subcontinent in one of the bloodiest crises, wrenching the complex cultural fabrics asunder in a crude division of Hindu and Muslim.
Nehru and Gandhi not only were aware of the ghastly effects of their decisions but were complicit in the violence. In 1947, Gandhi and Nehru were aware of the killings of Muslims in Jammu by Prince Hari Singh. The violence ensued because of the Partition and was “state-sponsored:” the RSS and the Patiala Punjab took part in this deliberate attempt to change Jammu’s demography to minority Muslim in order to make it easier for its’ annexation. (26) Gandhi commented on the killings, but Nehru preferred to stay silent as the staged genocide was crucial for the instrument of accession. (27) Tribal militias from Pakistan that had ties to Jammu invaded in response, thus birthing the Kashmir conflict. In 1948, Hyderabad, a princely state, did not secede to India. Nehru invaded with a misleading police action on the pretext of a Muslim militia suppressing Hindu villagers and the Nizam’s forces were defeated with little casualties. Historians say their desire to prevent an independent Muslim-led state taking root in the heart of predominantly Hindu India was a reason. (28) The invasion resulted in the arson, looting and the mass murder and rape of Muslims, with casualties between 27 - 40, 000. Nehru sent out a fact-finding mission but never published the Sunderlal Report, again staying silent in favor of maintaining the same Hindu majority he silently advocated for.
During both World Wars, Indian nationalism was stifled through various acts and the subcontinent was ravaged by inflation and famine which only “which only exacerbated pre-existing communal divides.” (29) World War One in many ways marked the demise of British colonialism. The British Raj promised greater autonomy as a reward for partaking in the war but the Jallianwala Bagh massacre by the British-Indian army radicalized Indian popular opinion, shifting to anti-colonial nationalism. With separate electorates via the Montagu Reforms, narrow identities were created, splitting Indian nationalism across communal and class lines. In an effort to maintain their power, the British passed the 1935 Act but the stage was set for the transfer of power. The Partition in many ways was the sole fault of the British Raj’s failures, misadventures, and an inevitable consequence of colonization and imperialism. By putting men such as Lord Mountbatten and Sir Radcliffe in charge of dividing an entire subcontinent they had no substantial ties to, the latter of which sped up the process in his own impatience, the British Raj is more to blame than anyone else. The British Raj plundered both the land and the bodies of Indians and in the end made a hasty retreat with only seven casualties, leaving the bloodshed to impact Indians only. (30) However, because this paper seeks to add historical depth and context to today’s communal prejudice, I focused on whether Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Congress high command were individually and collectively responsible for the partition of India in 1947, and thus morally culpable for the bloodshed and violence pursuant to that division. I explored the ways in which Hindutva nationalism and the unwillingness to compromise mischaracterized the Partition as a separatist ideal. This manifested into the alienation and the violent expressions of communalism that are to be held responsible for both the Partition and the recent post-colonial legacies that have been brought to light.
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